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Cyber-securityAbstract Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs) are an integral part of a sustainable and resi-
lient smart grid. The security of such critical cyber-physical infrastructure is considered as a major
priority for both industry and academia. In this paper, we propose a new distributed smart-contract
based control approach of BESSs to enable collaborative and secure operations among them. We
present a comprehensive discussion on how control strategies can be implemented as smart con-
tracts and deployed on a distributed network of BESSs nodes in order to operate these storage sys-
tems according to secure consensus. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, we analyze
the vulnerabilities of BESSs when controlled according to traditional schemes vs. smart-contract
enabled control. Simulation results show that if individual BESSs achieve a certain maximum
threshold of exploitability, then the network of distributed BESSs is more robust to cyber-
attacks in smart contract-defined control.
 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria
University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs) provide viable solu-
tions for improving efficiency and reliability in smart grids.
They have multiple benefits such as enhancing the power qual-
ity and promoting the dispersion of renewable energy sources.
More importantly, BESSs perform peak-shaving which is one
of the major mitigation measures against power disturbances
or outages that might occur when the demand on a feeder ora substation exceeds expected limits, leading to harmful ther-
mal stress on distribution transformers [1,2].
BESSs boost the reliability through storing excessive gener-
ated energy when the demand is less than the supply, and
releasing stored energy when needed, effectively balancing sup-
ply and demand in real-time and attempting to level the load
curve. In general, integrating BESSs into the smart grid
increases the inertia of the power system and guarantees the
system’s robustness to endure various demand curves [3].
Due to their essential role in the smart grid, BESSs are con-
sidered as important cyber-physical systems to be secured. The
deep integration between cyber and physical infrastructures in
smart grids makes them vulnerable to a wide range of
cyber-attacks that eventually have severe consequences. For
example, False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) might lead to
physical damage of critical components or economic loss [4].
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gies has played an essential role in the Ukrainian cyber-grid
attack that led to a complete black-out [5]. Thus, adopting
secure cyber-infrastructure is necessary for the smart grid.
Energy storage units accompany renewable energy sources
like wind turbines and photovoltaics which are spread across
multiple areas. Thus, BESSs are not only located at the sec-
ondary substations, but also distributed along the feeders,
upper to lower stream [6], forming a network of distributed
data acquisition, storing, and processing nodes.
In a smart grid, a network of BESSs can be controlled
through decentralized, centralized, and distributed multi-
agent control architectures. In decentralized control architec-
ture, each BESS gathers measurements locally from its
directly-connected point of common coupling. Based on this
gathered information and the SoC, the operation mode (charg-
ing, discharging, or idle) is determined. Due to the lack of com-
munication between the different BESSs, collaborative control
strategies/algorithms cannot be realized [7]. On the other hand.
Centralized architectures use a central controller to collect
multiple information from different BESSs and implement a
common objective which cannot be done by each BESS alone.
For example, SoC balancing which increases batteries’ effi-
ciency and lifetime [3]. While the central controller allows for
coordination between distributed BESSs which is beneficial
from a power systems perspective, it introduces major security
concerns as it forms a single point of failure [8].
Distributed multi-agent architectures are used as an alterna-
tive to decentralized and centralized architectures. Each BESS
is modeled as an autonomous agent which connects with mul-
tiple neighbors and exchange information to be used in calcu-
lating its operation mode. Thus, distributed architectures can
be used to achieve a common objective for the BESSs systems
in the smart grid without the need of the central controller [3].
The distributed nature of BESSs widens the attack surface
for adversaries and calls for secure, reliable, and fault-tolerant
distributed computing paradigms that can protect energy stor-
age systems against cyber-attacks without hindering their
coordinated operations [9,10]. Blockchain is one of the most
secure distributed systems architectures available in the ICT
space. It is a peer-to-peer (p2p) network architecture in which
all participating nodes reach consensus about the general state
of a shared digital asset. Each participating node keeps an
append-only, cryptographically-linked, and agreed-upon
record of all events (transactions) that occur in the network,
known as the Distributed Ledger (DL), making data manipu-
lation extremely hard [11,12].
Blockchain platforms have evolved to form what is known
as general-purpose blockchains, or programmable block-
chains. General-purpose blockchains (e.g., Ethereum [13])
enable any programmed logic (smart contract) to be deployed
on the distributed network. A Smart contract is represented by
a set of instructions that describe the behavior of nodes in the
network. The execution of these instructions is replicated and
their outcome is verified by consensus even when one or more
node fail (crash failure) or exhibit a malicious behavior
(Byzantine failure) which is why smart contracts are consid-
ered as more secure and self-enforcing as opposed to conven-
tional centralized control software programs [14,15].
Blockchain technology has been used extensively in the
energy sector [16]. However, most of the used cases are con-
cerned with energy trading, for example, peer-to-peer (p2p)energy trading enables prosumers who have an excessive
amount of energy (e.g., from solar panels) to sell it in real-
time to their neighbors for a specific amount of tokens [17].
Various aspects of blockchain-based energy trading have been
studied. These include automated negotiation [18], optimal
p2p power flow [19], privacy-preserving trading [20], safe p2p
trading under network constraints [21], and green certificates
[22]. Authors in [16] survey many applications of blockchain
in energy trading. In this article, we focus more on blockchain
and smart contracts’ potential as distributed control enablers
to enhance the security of the smart grid’s operations.
Limited research has been done to investigate leveraging
blockchains and smart contracts to securely control distributed
cyber-physical systems [11,15]. A notable application was pre-
sented in [23] where the Advanced Measurement Infrastructure
(AMI) network is reconfigured as a blockchain network in
which smart meters are modeled as blockchain nodes. The pro-
posed working mechanism describes the data exchange and
verification processes. The authors mainly utilized the dis-
tributed storage benefits of the blockchain without focusing
on distributed control through smart contracts. Mathematical
analysis showed that the proposed architecture is more secure
than the traditional AMI networks since malicious manipula-
tion of meters’ measurements in the blockchain-based architec-
ture is much harder.
Authors in [24] also modeled smart meters as nodes in a
blockchain network to secure their measurements from mali-
cious modification. In addition, smart contracts are deployed
on the blockchain in order to control these smart meters so
as to enforce automated actions – For example, power cut in
case of meter manipulation by customers. Attack models on
smart contracts and their corresponding security analysis were
not discussed. Nonetheless, the authors highlighted the multi-
ple distinguishing factors of their proposed blockchain-based
architecture (e.g., avoiding single point of failure) from other
conventional ones (cloud-based data collection).
An application of blockchain that focuses on the privacy of
smart meters was introduced in [25]. Smart meters in each
neighborhood form a blockchain network in which all the
readings are aggregated and communicated to higher supervi-
sory layers. Each node utilizes multiple pseudonyms to hide its
private data from its blockchain peers. Further, nodes that
aggregate and validate transaction are randomly selected (by
blockchain design) so that a malicious user cannot increase
the probability of a successful information disclosure attack.
This use-case leveraged key blockchain features but did not
utilize the distributed control capabilities of smart contracts.
Su et al. [26] leveraged a blockchain architecture with smart
contracts to enforce Electric Vehicles (EV) charging schemes.
The application focuses mainly on regulating the operation
between EV customers and charging utilities to avoid fraud.
Non-repudiation attacks by malicious energy consumers and
false-advertising attacks by energy providers are studied, and
smart contracts are used to enforce a predefined set of regula-
tions that guarantee the mitigation of these attacks.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the importance of con-
trolling distributed BESSs through smart contracts. Distinct
from the literature, which mainly employed smart contracts
for energy trading or as regulation enforcement tools, we uti-
lize the distributed computing nature of smart contracts to
deploy secure and resilient control algorithms for BESSs.
The main contributions are summarized as:
Table 1 BESS assets and corresponding threats.
Layer Vulnerability
Secure smart contract-enabled control of BESSs 1293 Introducing a methodology of implementing charging/dis-
charging control strategies of BESSs as smart contracts.
To that end, we introduce an example control strategy
and show how it can be realized as a smart contract between
BESS nodes.
 Providing a comprehensive discussion with steps of how
distributed smart contract-based control strategy can oper-
ate a network of BESSs.
 Performing exploitability analysis of BESS vulnerabilities
when conventional control approaches are used vs. smart-
contract enabled control to showcase security advantages
of the proposed solution along with necessary parameters
to achieve this improvement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the BESS cyber-physical system and its security
requirements. Section 3 introduces a charging/discharging con-
trol strategy that is implemented as a smart contract along
with its working mechanism. Then, we analyze the security
advantages of smart contract control compared to conven-
tional schemes and present simulation results in Section 4
before concluding the paper in Section 5.
2. Battery energy storage system model
An abstract model of a BESS is shown in Fig. 1. BESS is mod-
eled as a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) since it has a physical
part that is constantly monitored and controlled, and
software-based (cyber) part that stores, communicates, and
processes data in order to make control decisions [27]. The
physical part consists of the battery, a meter that measures
its State of Charge (SoC), sensors to collect information from
connected loads, and the power electronic (P.E) converter that
performs the charging and discharging process. The software-
based component (cyber component) contains a communica-
tion interface that is used to communicate information
between different BESSs, and the control software that dis-
patches the charging/discharging commands to the power elec-
tronic controller. These commands are based on the collected
SoC, the local measurements taken from the point of common
coupling, and potentially on information from different BESSs
through the communication interface.
In order to perform security analysis, we model the BESS
mathematically as a target for cyber attacks. Such modelFig. 1 BESS Model as a cyber-physical system.should describe the probability of successful exploitation of
any of the BESS vulnerabilities and hence the probability of
a successful attack on the BESS. The BESS comprises three
layers: sensing, communication (between a network of CPSs),
and a control layer, reminiscent of [28]. Control decisions (i.e.,
determining charging, discharging, and idle operation mode)
are made by a control strategy based on the holistic data col-
lected from all nodes. The vulnerability of each layer is shown
in Table 1, and Fig. 2 visualizes all possible attack paths.
Hence, it forms a sample space S of possible methods to attack
a BESS unit. An attack is deemed successful if the adversary is
able to successfully exploit one or more vulnerabilities as
shown in the tree diagram. Thus, the probability of launching
a successful attack against a BESS Pr Að Þ can be written as the
complement of successfully mitigating all attacks:
Pr Að Þ ¼ 1 Pr v1ð Þ  Pr v2ð Þ  Pr v3ð Þð Þ ð1Þ
Eq. (1) is a mathematical representation of the BESS’s secu-
rity requirement. The objective is to make Pr Að Þ as small as
possible through minimizing the exploitability of vulnerabili-
ties v1; v2, and v3. The exploitability of a vulnerability is the
probability value of successful exploitation of that vulnerabil-
ity [29] (i.e., Pr v1ð Þ;Pr v2ð Þ;Pr v3ð Þ).
3. The proposed blockchain-based architecture
3.1. Overview
A blockchain-based architecture that controls BESSs nodes
per a smart contract can be considered as a special case of
the distributed control architectures. In this architecture,
BESSs are modeled as nodes in a private blockchain. All nodes
in this blockchain network are known, and each node stores its
own cryptographic private key and a list of public keys corre-
sponding to all other nodes. Further, there exists a communi-
cation channel between every node and all other nodes in order
to realize the distributed (peer-to-peer) p2p network. Each
node has a copy of the distributed ledger. A smart contractFig. 2 Tree diagram of possible attack paths against BESS
assets, green path indicates successful mitigation of all attacks.
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Communication Replace packets in communication channels (v1)
Control Interrupt operation mode computation (v2)
Sensing Compromise meter/sensors readings (v3)
1294 N. Mhaisen et al.(control program) is deployed into the ledger to define BESSs
operations.
Sensing devices of each node are modeled as ‘‘oracles” of
the blockchain. A blockchain oracle is a system independent
from the blockchain network that provides information from
the real world necessary for the smart contracts to execute
[30]. In the distributed BESSs network, sensing devices that
determine the SoC and power measurements at each BESS
provide this information to the smart contract which executes
predefined logic to determine operation mode to be followed
by all network nodes. The smart contract represents the
encoded rules that determine nodes’ behaviors. In our case,
the smart contract will represent a control strategy (algorithm)
which specifies each BESS’s operation mode (charging, dis-
charging, or idle) according to its SoC, connected load status,
and other BESSs’ SoCs.
The cyber-infrastructure of a BESS in a blockchain-based
network is shown in Fig. 3. Each BESS submits a set of local
measurements to the blockchain network through its commu-
nication interface. The operation mode is determined through
the last confirmed block’s state St.
3.2. The control strategy
We propose a simple example control strategy (charging/dis-
charging strategy) that requires BESSs to maintain a minimum
amount of energy reserve necessary to support the smart grid
in unexpected conditions. Assume that an adversary attempts
to synchronize the maximum load demands of individual cus-
tomers in order to achieve a diversified demand equal or close
to the maximum noncoincident point that cannot be endured
by the distribution transformer. There are multiple ways to
achieve such synchronization, such as sending fake mobile
messages to customers promoting reduced fees during a dura-
tion of time. In such cases, the BESSs will be used to level out
the load curves of their corresponding loads. However, if
BESSs were not able to bring the diversified demand down
to a safe value (which depends on the network specification),
the distribution transformer may be tripped. BESSs might fail
to provide the required power for the entire attack duration
because they might have been discharged previously during
their normal operations [31].
In order to prevent such an unstable situation, a control
strategy in which all BESSs are connected and their behavior
is coordinated securely is needed. This secure coordination
should ensure that at any given point of time, BESSs are col-
lectively able to provide the power required to maintain the
diversified demand curve in safe margins:Fig. 3 Cyber system of a BESS in blockchain network.X
i
Ei P Dp tattackð Þ ð2Þ
where Ei is the energy storage available in BESSi;Dp is the dif-
ference between the maliciously induced load and the maxi-
mum safety rating for the distribution transformer, and tattack
is the duration of attack (i.e., the duration in which Dp is
induced).
Eq. (2) gives the minimum amount of energy reserve which
can be determined based on network requirements (i.e., esti-
mated Dp and tattack). Hence, discharging operations should
not be performed if they will lead to violating (2).
The operation mode of BESSi is denoted as S i½ , the state of
node i, which can be C, D or I to indicate charging, discharg-
ing, or idle mode, respectively. S i½  is updated according to the
strategy in (3) at certain predefined time intervals. Conditions
are explained as follows:
Let Pi;avg be the average load capacity of Li;Pi;n be the
actual load capacity of Li at the time slot n; r% be the deviation
from the average value that determines the load capacity lim-
its, and SoCi be the SoC of BESS node i.
Pi;lower ¼ Pi;avg  r% Pi;avg
Pi;upper ¼ Pi;avg þ r% Pi;avg In (3a), the demand of Li is less than the lower limit. Thus,
T is responsible of charging BESSi in addition to providing
necessary power for Li (valley filling).
 In (3b), the demand of Li increases which makes T respon-
sible for only providing power to feed Li
 In (3c), the power demand of Li keeps increasing, exceeding
the upper limit. However, since (2) is satisfied, BESSi can
start discharging to perform peak shaving. In (3d), despite
the increased power demand of Li, the transformer alone
is required to endure the extra power needs in order to pre-
serve enough energy that satisfies (2).
S i½  ¼
C if Pi;n 6 Pi;lower and SoCi < 90% að Þ
I if Pi;lower 6 Pi;n 6 Pi;upper bð Þ
D if Pi;upper 6 Pi;n and SoCi > 10% and 2ð Þ holds cð Þ
I ifPi;upper 6 Pi;n and 2ð Þ does not hold dð Þ
8>><
>>:
ð3Þ
Note that other more complicated control strategies than
the one introduced can still be deployed as smart contracts.
However, the focus of this paper is the working mechanism
of the smart-contract defined control (i.e., how can a particular
control strategy be deployed as a smart contract and what ben-
efits would such deployment yield) rather than the chosen con-
trol strategy.3.3. Smart contract configuration
We describe how the aforementioned strategy is defined as a
smart contract. A smart contract has a set of participants that
are bound by the contract, a state that determines the current
status (operation mode) of all participants, and operations that
participants invoke to update the state.
Secure smart contract-enabled control of BESSs 1295Participating parties:
 Loads distributed across feeders: Li where i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;
n; . . . ;N .
 BESS nodes distributed across feeders: BESSi where
i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n; . . . ;N .
 The distribution transformer T
State:
Nodes determine their operation mode from the state vari-
able of the contract. The smart contract has one state variable
S which is an array that contains the operation mode of all
BESSs (i.e., S i½  represents the operation mode of BESSi). Ini-
tially, all nodes are initialized with I state.
Operations:
The operations are functions that participants use (call) to
interact with the contract and update its state. Thus, the
defined smart contract should have a function that allows
BESSs to submit their measurements to the contract.
The smart contract is described in Algorithm 1. It can be
written in a programming language supported by any smart
contract platform, compiled into bytecode and deployed on
the network. A smart contract deployment is a special transac-
tion that stores the binary code of the control program (smart
contract) in the distributed ledger. Then, the contract will be
available for each node in the network to interact with it in
the manner shown in the following section.
Algorithm 1. Smart contract
RequireMi: The set of local measurements (SoCiand Pi;n) at each
node.
Ensure Updated state array S that contains the operation mode
of each node
Contract State:
1: S I; I; . . . ; I½ (Initialization)
Contract Operations:
2: Update Local Measurements (Mi):
3: Verify digital signature
4: Trigger update State(Mi)
5: Update State (Mi):
6: Update S i½  through substituting Mi in (3)3.4. Smart contract working mechanism
In this section, we explain how BESS nodes interact with the
smart contract in order to determine their operation mode in
a coordinated and secure manner. As mentioned earlier, the
state of nodes is updated at regular intervals (time steps). At
the beginning of the time step t, a leader that is responsible
for generating Blockt is selected. The network is assumed to
be synchronous, which means that all messages will be deliv-
ered within a certain time bound. Also, all BESS nodes are
synchronized within the same UNIX time tu. To select the
node responsible for generating a block, The index s of each
step is deterministically calculated by each node as
s ¼ tu
step duration
, where step duration is a constant determining
the duration of a step. The leader of step s;BESSi, is deter-
mined by every node throughBESSi ¼ s mod N ð4Þ
where N is the number of nodes. BESSi is responsible for gen-
erating blocks during the step_duration (leader of time step t)
[32]. This technique of circulating the block generator node
is known as Proof-of-Authority consensus and is visualized
in Fig. 5.
After the leader of the current time step is known, all nodes
perform two main phases. First, data collection and submis-
sion to the chain. Then, global state update and consensus.
These phases are presented as steps in Fig. 4 and performed
at every time step.
3.4.1. Data collection and submission to the chain
Each node collects the set of measurementsMi through its sen-
sors (oracle) and submits them through a transaction (Txn)
broadcasted to all nodes on the network (steps 1 & 2). Namely,
the transaction is a call to UpdateLocalMeasurment method
defined in the smart contract (Algorithm 1). All transactions
in the blockchain network are digitally signed. A digital signa-
ture of a node i is a hash of the original message that is
encrypted with a node’s private key. The digital signature of
each transaction is appended, and the Message is broadcasted
to all nodes on the network.
HashedTxn ¼ H transactionð Þ
Message ¼ transaction|fflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Msg 0½ 
;Eprivate keyi HashedTxnð Þ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Msg 1½ 
8><
>:
9>=
>;
where H is a one-way standard hash function such as SHA-256
or SHA-512 [33], and E is an asymmetric encryption function
which ensures the message can be decrypted with only the cor-
responding public keyi.
Each receiving node verifies the digital signature through
the following steps
DecryptedHash ¼ Dpublic keyi Msg 1½ ð Þ ð5Þ
HashedTxn ¼ H Msg 0½ ð Þ ð6Þ
verify DecryptedHash ¼ HashedTxn ð7Þ
where D is an asymmetric encryption function that decrypts a
message encrypted with private keyi through public keyi. If the
equality in (7) holds, then the receiving node verifies two
things: First, the transaction was not manipulated during
transmission since otherwise the hash obtained in (6) would
be different. Second, the transactions did actually originate
from the sender node and not from a malicious entity attempt-
ing to impersonate the sending node since the decryption in (5)
through the sender public key is successful. At this stage, each
node has a pool of valid transactions.
3.4.2. State update and consensus
The next step is that the leader forms a candidate block of
valid transactions in a specific order that it determines (step
3), and execute these transactions according to the smart con-
tract code assumed to be deployed at block t 2 (step 4). This
execution triggers the UpdateState () which updates the con-
tract state variable S. The state resulting from executing all
transactions contained in block t is denoted St (known as the
state of the block t or the state of the contract at block t). St
is an array that contains the operation mode of all nodes at
Fig. 4 Data flow in smart-contract enabled control strategy (steps circled).
Fig. 5 Block generation circulation in PoA blockchains.
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of the previous block St1. Formally:
St ¼ ! St1;Cð Þ : C ¼ Txn 2 Block tf g ð8Þ
where ! is the state transition function which is characterized
by executing the set of all transactions in block t to form St.
The hash of the previous block is also added to the current
block in order to form a link with the previous block. Then,
the current block as a whole is hashed to form Hasht which
is appended to the block. Hash linking is necessary to detect
any modification in the chain of blocks; if the content of any
block is modified, the hash of that block will change, and since
a pointer to this hash is included in the next block, the hash of
the next block will also change. This will propagate all the way
until the most recent block, creating a version of the block-
chain that is different from the one agreed upon by the net-
work. After the candidate block is formed and its state is
determined, the validator announces it to the network for con-
firmation (step 5).
Receiving nodes validate the candidate block’s state by first
verifying transactions included in the block against (7). Then
each node independently executes transactions available in
the block (i.e., executes ! St1;Cð ) (step 6). If transactions
included in the block are all valid, and they are executed cor-
rectly according to the rules encoded in the smart contract,
then all nodes should reach a block whose state St is identical.
Each node then votes on the validity of the candidate block t
(step 7); If the node reaches St which is identical to the received
one, a vote of acceptance is broadcasted. Else, a vote of denial
to this state is broadcasted. Votes are unique, and only one
vote per node per block is allowed. At this stage, each node
knows the block which is believed by the majority of the net-
work. This block is then committed to the local copy of the
blockchain, and the state of that block now drives the opera-
tions of nodes (step 8).3.5. Block generation
Each block contains a state that determines the operation
mode of network nodes. Thus, the operation of all nodes is
updated each time a new block is generated and confirmed.
Let U denote the system’s operation mode’s update require-
ment (i.e., the charging, discharging and idle state of every
node is required to be determined every U seconds), / is the
block generation rate, and tc is the time required before con-
sensus is reached on the generated block is. Then the block
generation and confirmation should occur before U so that
nodes can update their operation at U seconds intervals This
is expressed by the constraint shown in (9):
/þ tc 6 U ð9Þ
tc depends on the network conditions; for example, a network
with high speed and throughput would have minimal tc
because it can transmit node’s votes and blocks faster. In gen-
eral, a specific upper bound for tc can be calculated when net-
work specifications are known. Similarly, / is deterministic;
this is because once a BESS identifies that it is responsible
for current block generation through (4), the time required
to form a block is / and is mainly determined by the time
needed to execute the block’s transactions. Thus, values for
/ and tc that satisfy (9) can be obtained.4. Evaluation of the proposed system
4.1. Features comparison
Table 2 summarises the main key difference points between the
centralized, decentralized, distributed, and the distributed
smart contract-enabled control approaches. We refer to the
distributed smart-contract enabled architecture as S.C
enabled. As mentioned earlier, cooperative objectives cannot
be realized in decentralized architectures since nodes do not
have a global view about the smart grid. Centralized architec-
tures always pose threats of having a single Point of Failure
(PoF), while this issue is not present in distributed, and dis-
tributed S.C enabled approaches. However, only in S.C
enabled control nodes can verify operation mode through
the blockchain version that achieved consensus. Flexibility is
still possible since the smart contract rules (defined in Sec-
tion 3.2) can be replaced with another strategy with no changes
to other parts of this structure. Lastly, having the blockchain
Table 2 Features of different control architectures.
Factors Decentr. Centr. Distrib. Distrib.
S.C
Cooperative Objectives N Y Y Y
Without SoF Y N Y Y
Verifiable Operation Mode N N N Y
Flexible Y Y Y Y
Data Provenance N N N Y
Secure smart contract-enabled control of BESSs 1297guarantees data provenance which allows secure audits of logs
to be used for forensics or operation monitoring. Since all
actions of nodes will be recorded and replicated on the block-
chain, integrity of these logs are highly preserved.4.2. Security analysis
In this section, we derive the exploitabilities of the BESS vul-
nerabilities discussed earlier in Table 1 when controlled
according to a smart contracts-defined strategy. For conve-
nience, we refer to decentralized, centralized or distributed
architecture as normal scenarios. Thus, Prn xð Þmeans the prob-
ability of x under normal scenario. Also, PrS:C xð Þ means the
probability of x under smart contract enabled control. Table 3
summarizes the probabilities of each vulnerability in normal
and S.C enabled control.4.2.1. Communication layer
Let l be the probability of an attacker hacking the communi-
cation interface of a BEES node (e.g., through a-man-in-the-
middle attack), then in the normal scenarios, Prn v1ð Þ ¼ l
because the attacker will be able to replace packets in the com-
munication channels if the communication interface is com-
promised. On the other hand, on an S.C enabled distributed
architecture, the digital signature technique is adopted in
blockchain communication to verify all messages communi-
cated between blockchain nodes. Hence, v1 will be harder to
achieve because the attacker needs not only to hack the com-
munication interface, but also obtain the private key of the
sender node in order to alter the packets. This will result in
a lower probability of v1:
Pr
S:C
v1ð Þ ¼ g l ð10Þ
where g is the probability of obtaining the private key of the
sender node.Table 3 Events’ probabilities in different scenarios.
Vulnerability
(vi)
Exploitability in normal
scenario (Prn við Þ)
Exploitability in S.C
enabled (PrS:C við Þ)
v1 l l g
v2 k PN
x¼k
N
x
 
kk
 
kNk
 
v3 q q4.2.2. Control layer
Let k be the probability of an attacker hacking the control soft-
ware of a BESS node (e.g., Denial-of-Service attack, or code
manipulation attack), then in the normal scenarios Prn v2ð Þ ¼ k
because the attacker can interrupt/alter operation mode if the
control software is compromised. However, in S.C enabled con-
trol, a similar manipulation to St manipulation can be detected
since the hash of the block t will be different from the majority
(out of consensus). Thus, the most recent and valid block along
with its state St can be imported from peers and the node can
determine the operation mode from it. To completely interrupt
operation mode calculations of any node in a blockchain net-
work, an attacker needs to successfully hack the control soft-
ware in at least the majority of the nodes in order to force the
network to come to a consensus on amalicious state. In this case,
PrS:C v2ð Þ, can be interpreted as the cumulative binomial distri-
bution function Pr XP kð Þ where X is a random variable that
represents the number of hacked nodes and k represents the
majority threshold, formally:
PrS:C v2ð Þ ¼
XN
x¼k
N
x
 
kk
 
kNk
 
k ¼ Nþ 1
2
ð11Þ4.2.3. Sensing layer
Lastly, let q is the probability of an attacker hacking the sens-
ing infrastructure of a BESS (e.g., through a physical manipu-
lation of the sensing device), then Prn v3ð Þ ¼ q since the
attacker can then alter meters/sensors readings of that BESS.
Similarly PrS:C v3ð Þ ¼ q (did not change). This is expected since
the blockchain based architecture is not responsible for data
collected by real-world sensors (oracles) before entering the
blockchain.
4.3. Simulation
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture
through monte-carlo style simulation to calculate the probabil-
ity of a successful attack against a BESS node configured in
either normal mode or smart-contract enabled mode. The
probability of a successful attack Pr Að Þ is given in (1), values
from Table 3 are substituted in (1) to get the probability of a
successful attack in each scenario:
Pr
n
Að Þ ¼ 1 1 Pr
n
v1ð Þ
 
1 Pr
n
v2ð Þ
 
1 Pr
n
v3ð Þ
 
¼ 1 1 lð Þ 1 kð Þ 1 qð Þ
ð12Þ
Pr
S:C
Að Þ¼ 1 1Pr
S:C
v1ð Þ
 
1Pr
S:C
v2ð Þ
 
1Pr
S:C
v3ð Þ
 
¼ 1 1 lgð Þð Þ 1
XN
x¼k
N
x
 
k

k
 
kNk
  !
1qð Þ
ð13Þ
Fig. 6(a) shows the probability of a successful attack in
both scenarios, and under multiple numbers of nodes (N) in
the S.C enabled scenario (normal scenario does not depend
on N). The values of l; k, and q (which corresponds to the
probability of attacker successfully hacking the communica-
tion channel, the control software, or the sensing devices of
Fig. 6 Probability of successful attack in different scenarios: (a) all layers considered, (b) communication layer, (c) control layer with (d)
effect of increasing majority threshold, and (e) sensing layer.
1298 N. Mhaisen et al.a BESS, respectively) are assumed to be equal and increase
uniformly at a rate of 5% through the x-axis. The value of g
is uniformly randomly generated in the range 0.4 to 0.5, and
the majority threshold k is set to 51%. The y-axis represents
the probability of a successful attack.
To further investigate this phenomenon and the perfor-
mance of the proposed solution, we simulate Pr Að Þ with
respect to individual hacking probabilities. Figs. 6(b), (c),
and (d), show the probability of a successful attack when each
of l; k, and q vary, respectively, while the other two are
assumed to be fixed at very low value (5%), N is assumed to
be 100 in these cases.
4.4. Discussion
From Fig. 6(a); it can be seen that Pr Að Þ is generally less in the
S.C enabled architecture. For example, in case of N ¼ 100, the
maximum difference is reached when the hacking probabilities
are 40%, at this point, the attack is 27% less likely to succeed
in S.C enabled architecture compared to normal ones. How-
ever, when the hacking probabilities are high, the difference
becomes smaller. In fact, depending on the number of nodes,
the probability of a successful attack on S.C enabled architec-
ture is actually higher. For instance, starting at 55% hacking
probability, a 100 nodes S.C enabled network is 5% more
likely to undergo a successful attack. Thus, it can be suggested
that the S.C enabled control is more secure as long as the hack-
ing probabilities of individual nodes are not higher than a
threshold which is 54% in this specific settings.
In Fig. 6(b), under the normal scenario, Prn Að Þ is linear
with l. PrS:C Að Þ is approximately linear also. However, the
slope is reduced by a factor of g. In Fig. 6(c), Prn Að Þ is also lin-
ear in terms of k. However, PrS:C represents the binomial dis-
tribution expressed in (13) where value of k is calculated
from the ratio (k ¼ sN). An important insight is that the
PrS:C Að Þ in the smart contract-enabled case changes rapidly
during a short interval from a small to large values. The fact
that the S.C enabled control of a BESS network is more robustto cyber attacks until certain limit but actually more prone to
attacks thereafter (as was shown in Fig. 6(b)) stems from the
binomial distribution model of the control layer exploitability.
The higher the majority vote required, the more hacking capa-
bilities needed by the attacker to surpass this sensitive interval.
However, one cannot arbitrarily increase the majority thresh-
old because this will require nodes to wait for s% of the votes
on the block validity before reaching consensus, which will
increase time to consensus given by tc ¼ N s=votestp
(depicted in Fig. 6(d) where votestp is the votes processing
throughput of a node, it includes the time required to receive
and process votes. Since the operation mode of each node gets
updated with every new block, which is generated every tc, the
network requirement might not tolerate higher values of tc.
In Fig. 6(e), the performance is almost identical. This is
expected since the blockchain-based architecture does not pro-
vide more security for data collection. The main security
advantage is data immutability after being recorded on the
blockchain. Thus, if the physical sensing devices are malicious
in the first place a successful attack under any of the two sce-
narios is possible. This is a known challenge in systems inte-
grating physical components with blockchain-based cyber
components [34,35].
4.5. Limitations
Increasing the number of nodes in a blockchain network intro-
duces scalability issues related to data and processing replica-
tion on each node [34], and peer-to-peer (P2P) communication
overhead [36]. Thus, efficient P2P communication protocols
instead of the broadcast introduced here should be considered
as the number of nodes increases. Further, the control strategy
should be as efficient as possible since it will be replicated and
executed on every node on the network as a part of the smart
contract working mechanism. The control strategy introduced
in Section 3.2 has a constant time complexity O cð Þ since it is a
simple rule-based, if/else calculations. Also, applying secure
key management techniques is an essential point of any block-
Secure smart contract-enabled control of BESSs 1299chain network since it has a direct effect on the security of mes-
sages exchange. Hence, secure key management techniques tai-
lored to specific blockchain applications should be adapted
[37]. Lastly, the physical security of sensing and actuation
devices remains as a considerable limitation; if such devices
are manipulated to provide corrupted information about
real-world phenomena to the blockchain network, they can fal-
sely trigger smart contracts causing wrong states [35]. To
address this issue, machine learning-based (e.g., anomaly
detection) approaches should be investigated.5. Conclusion
This paper introduced the use of smart contracts to control
distributed Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs) in smart
grids enabling secure operation against potential cyber-
attacks. The proposed control approach improves the security
of BESSs by utilizing the replicated execution and state con-
sensus features as well as cryptographic techniques in commu-
nication. A smart contract that implements an example control
strategy is introduced and its working mechanism is illustrated,
different attack paths against BESSs are identified, and their
success probabilities are simulated. Results showed that for a
network of BESSs, the smart-contract enabled control archi-
tecture is more robust to cyber-attacks compared to central-
ized or multi-agent distributed architectures as long as
individual nodes are adequately secured (have a maximum
hacking probability).
Advances in programmable blockchains are expected to
enable more use cases to improve the resilience of critical infras-
tructure components. Future work can consider other use cases
for smart contracts or different attack scenarios that incorpo-
rate vulnerabilities impacts on the grid, leading to full risk anal-
ysis. In general, reliability feature of distributed computing can
be leveraged to enhance and secure collaborative operations of
different cyber-physical systems in the smart grid.Acknowledgement
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